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Abstract 
 
Motivated by classical political economy we detail a probabilistic, “statis- 
tical equilibrium” approach to explaining why even in equilibrium, the equal- 
ization of profit rates leads to a non-degenerate distribution. Based on this 
approach we investigate the empirical content of the profit rate distribution for 
previously unexamined annual firm level data comprising over 24,000 publicly 
listed North American firms for the period 1962-2014. We find strong evidence 
for a structural organization and equalization of profit rates on a relatively short 
time scale both at the economy wide and one- and two-digit SIC industry levels 
into a Laplace or double exponential distribution. We show that the statistical 
equilibrium approach is consistent with economic theorizing about profit rates 
and discuss research questions emerging from this novel look at profit rate dis- 
tributions. We also highlight the applicability of the underlying principle of 
maximum entropy for inference in a wide range of economic   topics. 
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the most pervasive assumptions in contemporary economic theories spanning 
various traditions is that competition leads to the formation of equal profit rates 
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for all firms in equilibrium. Yet, it is well understood by most economists that this 
situation, which predicts a “degenerate” distribution of profit rates, never actually 
obtains in reality as observed rates of profit tend to perpetually fluctuate. Available 
data from national accounts, that report only industry or sectoral averages but no 
higher moments of the distribution, and a theory that stresses the uniformity of 
profit rates reinforce the focus on a single rate of    profit. 
The English classical tradition that began with Adam Smith offers an alternative 
theoretical approach. Instead of neglecting deviations from the mean, the observed 
distribution of prices and profit rates are seen as inherent to the process of compe- 
tition and should be considered as the equilibrium state of competition itself. The 
appropriate method of analysis is, therefore, not that of the average profit rate, 
but a probabilistic approach that considers the entire spectrum of profit rates at 
any moment captured by its probability density. From this perspective, the resid- 
ual indeterminacy of profit rate deviations from the mean is provided with a rich 
theoretical  structure. 
A probabilistic approach to analyzing the behavior of economic variables has 
been proposed under the label of “statistical equilibrium” before to explain the 
distribution of prices, incomes and other variables. One of the earliest arguments for 
a probabilistic approach to study profit rates was made by Farjoun1983 (henceforth 
FM). Invoking the classical economists, FM argue that the uniformity assumption 
of profit rates is a “chimera” and “theoretical impossibility.” They propose that 
prices and profit rates should be treated as random variables that are driven not 
to a deterministic uniformity amongst capitals, but to time-invariant or stationary 
probability distributions with general forms that are “theoretically ascertainable and 
empirically verifiable.”1 With respect to the distribution of the rate of profit,   the 
authors go so far to as to claim the “theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that 
the rate of profit has a so-called gamma distribution.”(Farjoun1983) However, FM 
never detail the theoretical rationale for their claims, and they adduce little evidence 
for the rate of profit having any particular distribution, let alone a gamma one. 
In this paper we examine the notion of statistical equilibrium in economic the- 
ory and show the validity of this type of reasoning applied to the classical political 
economic theory about non-degenerate profit rate distributions, by studying the 
empirical distribution of the rate of profit. We explain the precise theoretical foot- 
ing of FM’s approach, which they elide in their book with a vague reference to 
physics,2  and show that it is consistent with economic theorizing.  Drawing on   firm 
level data for over 24,000 North American firms from 1962 to 2014 we use FM’s two 
conjectures:  that profit rates are stationary, and that they are gamma distributed, 
3 
 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Metroeconomica published Wiley on 7 June 2016, available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meca.12134  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23157/                                          
 
 
to discuss the shape of the distribution. We find strong evidence for a stationary 
profit rate distribution, but show that the gamma hypothesis is unnecessarily re- 
strictive in its assumptions and poorly supported by the data. Rather, we find that 
the general form of the profit rate distribution approximates the double exponen- 
tial or Laplace distribution, a distribution commonly found in industrial organiza- 
tion research (Alfarano2012; Bottazzi2003a; Bottazzi2003b; Bottazzi2006; 
Stanley1996). A probabilistic approach shows profit rate distributions in a fresh 
light that leads to asking new questions about competition and the determination 
of one of the most important variables in economic theory. 
The following section addresses the competitive process as a grounds for studying 
statistical equilibrium, section three outlines the concept of statistical equilibrium 
and its foundational principle of maximum entropy on which FM’s conjectures are 
based. Section four introduces the dataset with which we explore FM’s conjectures 
and section five shows the results obtained from analysis of the dataset. In section 
six we offer an alternative more parsimonious distribution based on the principle 
of maximum entropy, and in section seven we summarize our finding and discuss 
avenues  for further research. 
 
2 Competition as a Disorderly Process 
 
The assumption that all firms receive an equal rate of profit in equilibrium is a 
common point of departure across much of the spectrum of contemporary economic 
theory. The concept of equilibrium for profit rates predominantly  comes  in two 
forms. In the first one, profit rates are a priori uniform amongst perfectly compet- 
itive firms in an economy with all resources fully utilized; equilibrium is therefore 
a tautology. Deviations from uniformity are a result either of “shocks” that cre- 
ate a temporary disequilibrium with convergence back towards uniform rates, or 
imperfect competition (Mueller1986). 
The second form can be traced to Alfred Marshall’s concept of short- and long- 
run partial equilibrium (Marshall1890). Marshall maintained that while in the 
short run firms with different cost structures (the payment of  profits  or “quasi- 
rents” to capital providers being a cost) may exist, in the long run firms will enter 
or exit so as to force the price to equal the minimum average factor costs of the 
incumbent firms, equalizing profit rates as one of the factor costs (Foley2011). The 
divergence of rates of profit from uniformity is treated as a short-run phenomenon 
that can be abstracted from in the long run (Kurz1995). In either case, equilibrium 
is understood as a state of    uniformity. 
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The theory of equilibrium profit rates balances with the concomitant theory of 
competition. Indeed, a different theory of competition will lead to an alternative 
notion of how profit rates will appear over longer periods of time. A case in point 
is the – as Sraffa pointed out “submerged and forgotten” – approach of the English 
classical school and their critic, Karl Marx. Adam Smith1982 began from the 
notion that it was the competitive disposition of capital to persistently seek higher 
rates of profit and that through competition a tendency to the equalization of profit 
rates across all competitive industries would emerge. Karl Marx would later summa- 
rize competition as a perpetually turbulent and dynamic process whereby “capital 
withdraws from a sphere with a low rate of profit and wends its way to others that 
yield higher profit.” (Marx1981) This “constant migration” of capital leads to a 
distribution of capital among the various spheres of production and consequently a 
distribution  of  profit rates. 
From this perspective, the dynamics of profit rate oscillations can be understood 
as arising from a negative feedback mechanism. Capital seeking out sectors or 
industries where the profit rate is higher than the economy-wide average, generates 
new investment in these sectors attracting labor, raising output, and reducing prices 
and profit rates.3  On the reverse side, firms’ departure from industries earning below 
an average rate of profit has the opposite effect as the reduction in supply provides 
an incentive for capital to leave the sector, which leads to higher prices and profit 
rates for firms that remain in the sector. The important point is that the tendential 
gravitation of each industry’s rate of profit is an unintended consequence of the 
decisions of many individual firms. That is, firms do not choose their profit rates.  It 
is the entry and exit decisions of other firms in the process of competition that leads 
to a realization of a profit rate at any point in time. Resolution of the process of 
competition only emerges at the macroscopic scale as captured by the distribution 
of the prime mover of capital, the rate of profit.4 Arguably, Marx was well aware of 
this microscopic/macroscopic dichotomy as he   states, 
 
“[The] sphere [of circulation] is the sphere of competition, which is sub- 
ject to accident in each individual case; i.e. where the inner law that 
prevails through the accidents and governs them is visible only when 
these accidents are combined in large numbers, so that it remains invis- 
ible and incomprehensible to the individual agents of production them- 
selves.” (Marx1981) 
 
The question then is how to reconcile the ostensible disequilibrium phenomenon 
of  firm  level  profit  rates  with  a  robust  notion  of  equilibrium?    FM  answer this 
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question by turning to the alternative theoretical framework of classical statistical 
mechanics which allows them to explain how the observed “chaotic” movement of 
capital can give rise to a time invariant equilibrium profit rate distribution. Below we 
outline the intuition behind this notion of statistical equilibrium and its relationship 
with information theory in order to emphasize this method as one of inference. 
 
3 Statistical Mechanics and Statistical Equilibrium 
The methods that Farjoun and Machover promote in Laws of Chaos are those of 
statistical mechanics. While these methods have been well established in physics 
for more than a century dating back to the foundational work of Maxwell1860 
Boltzmann1871 and Gibbs1902 they have for the most part been unknown to 
economists.5 Important exceptions include the theoretical work of Duncan Foley, 
who coins the term statistical equilibrium in economics and uses it to model an ex- 
change economy (Foley1994) and unemployment in a labor market (Foley1996), 
the “classical econophysics” of Cottrell2009 who focus on the process of produc- 
tion,  exchange,  distribution,  and finance as a process of interacting physical   laws, 
a number of empirical studies on money, income and wealth distributions such as 
Chatterjee2005; Dragulescu2000; Franke2015; Isaac2014; Milakovic2003; 
Yakovenko2007; Scharfenaker2015; Schneider2015; Shaikh2014 and the re- 
cent work of Alfarano2012 who apply the principle of maximum entropy to profit 
rate distributions. Pioneering work in the application of statistical physics to eco- 
nomics is also contained in the work of Mantegna2000 who explore uses for these 
methods in analyzing the stock market. The recent work by Frohlich2013 also fol- 
lows FM’s approach and he finds evidence for gamma distributed profit rates using 
German input-output tables. All of these works include to some extent the notion 
of maximum entropy, either in its thermodynamic or its information theoretic form. 
We outline the basic intuition behind the concept of maximum entropy as a form 
of inference as in Jaynes1957a; Jaynes1957b; Jaynes1979 But in order to get 
to the inferential approach relevant to the problem at hand, we begin with a basic 
problem in physics that first led to the use of maximum entropy reasoning. 
 
3.1  Entropy in statistical mechanics 
An elementary problem in statistical physics is describing the state of an “ideal” 
gas, closed off from external influences, that consists of a very large number, N , of 
identical rapidly moving particles undergoing constant collisions with the walls of 
their container.  The intention is to derive certain thermodynamic features at the 
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macroscopic level (such as temperature or pressure) of the gas from the microscropic 
features of the gas, that is, from the configuration of all its particles. To describe 
the microscopic state of this system, however, requires specification of the position 
and momentum of each particle in 3-dimensional space. These 6N coordinates fully 
describe the microstate the system is in, but for any reasonable system of interest 
N » 1 and the degrees of freedom make such a description a formidable task. This 
problem invites a probabilistic approach to the determination of the microstate. 
The state of a particle can be mapped from these 6N microscopic degrees of 
freedom to an energy for the entire system. If we partition the state space of energy 
levels into discrete “bins” we can categorize individual particles corresponding to 
their level of energy associated with that particular bin.  We can then describe the 
distribution as a histogram vector {n1, n2, ..., nk} where k is the number of bins,  ni 
is the number of particles in bin i, and 
},
k nk = N , the total number of particles 
(degrees of freedom). The histogram describes the distribution of energy over the N 
particles but tells us nothing about the exact microscopic state of the system, i.e. the 
precise location of each particle within each bin. Since there are many combinations 
of particles that lead to the same distribution of particles over bins, any histogram 
will correspond to many microstates. An ensemble is such a partition of the state 
space with an assignment of probabilities that is a representation of the macro- 
scopic state of the system from which the salient features of the gas are derivable. 
The macrostate with the largest number of corresponding microstates describes the 
“statistical equilibrium” of the system. The number of microstates corresponding 
to any particular macrostate is the “multiplicity” of that macrostate. The insight of 
statistical mechanics is that macrostates of the gas that can be achieved by a large 
number of microstates, i.e. have higher multiplicity, are more likely to be observed 
because they can be realized in a greater number of ways. Because of the combina- 
torics, the multiplicity of a few macrostates will tend to be much higher than that 
of all others, effectively allowing for the prediction that the system will be in those 
highest or near highest multiplicity states most of the time. 
To see  this,  compute  the  multiplicity  of  any  microstate,  that  is  the  number 
of combinations of particle distributions over bins, which can be expressed as the 
multinomial coefficient 
N ! 
= n1!n2!...nk ! 
N ! 
(N n1 )!(N n2 )!...(N nk )! 
=
 
N ! 
 
 Np1!Np2!...Npk ! 
 
(1) 
N N N 
 
The numerator is the number of permutations of N and the denominator factors out 
all permutations with the same particles in a bin to arrive at combinations only.     For 
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j=1 
large N , the Stirling approximation log[N !] ≈ N logN − N is a good approximation 
to the logarithm of the multinomial   coefficient. 
 
 
log[ 
N ! 
 
 
n1!n2!...nk ! 
k 
] ≈ N log[N ] − 
, 
Npilog[Npi] (2) 
i=1 
k k 
= N log[N ] − N log[N ] 
, 
pi − N 
, 
pilog[pi] (3) 
i=1 
k 
i=1 
= −N 
, 
pilog[pi] (4) 
i=1 
 
This sum is therefore an approximation of the logarithm of the combinations 
(multiplicities) and is called entropy.6 The logarithm of the multiplicity is a concave 
function of the probability nk/N = pi. Since the probabilities sum to one and since 
the entropy is a concave function of the multiplicity, the entropy corresponding to 
the macrostate with the largest multiplicity – entropy at its maximum – occurs when 
all probabilities are equal, pi  = k/N,  ∀i. 
Constraints on the possible configuration of particles can be imposed, since typ- 
ically there is some knowledge about the system that makes some configurations 
more or less probable. These tend to take the form of linear functions of the proba- 
bilities. For example, imposing the condition that energy is conserved results in the 
constraint on the mean energy in the system. Maximizing entropy (the concave ob- 
jective function in Eq. 4), subject to the constraint that the momenta of the particles 
result in a kinetic energy equal to the total energy of the system coarse-grained into 
N discrete energy states, 
},N xjpj  = x¯  is a mathematical programming problem 
that is quite familiar to economists (Foley2003).7 
 
3.2 The maximum entropy principle of inference 
Claude Shannon1948 working on problems of digital communications at Bell Labs 
in 1948, had a very practical interest in developing a consistent measure of the 
“amount of information” in the outcome of a random variable transmitted across a 
communication channel.  He wanted  logical and intuitive conditions to be  satisfied 
in constructing a consistent measure of the amount of uncertainty associated with a 
random variable X using only the probabilities pi[xi], xi ∈ X.8 Shannon discovered 
that this measure of information, the average length of a message, was identical 
to the expression for entropy in thermodynamics (Eq. 4). Shannon was interested 
in assigning probabilities to messages so as to maximize the capacity of a commu- 
nication channel.  The physicist Edwin T. Jaynes (Jaynes1957a) recognized the 
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generality of Shannon’s result and discovered that this situation is not very different 
from that in statistical mechanics, where the physicist must assign probabilities to 
various states. He argued that the number of possibilities in either case was so great 
that the frequency interpretation of probability would clearly be absurd as a means 
for assigning probabilities.  Instead, he showed that Eq. 4 is a measure of information 
that is to be understood as a measure of uncertainty or ignorance.9  That is, the 
probability assignment in Eq. 4 describes a state of knowledge in the sense common 
to Bayesian reasoning. 
From this perspective, Jaynes argued that imposing constraints on systems that 
change the maximum entropy distribution, such as energy conservation, are just 
instances of using information for inference. Inferring the maximum entropy dis- 
tribution subject to information about the system is what Jaynes then referred to 
as the principle of maximum entropy inference (PME).10 In an economic context, 
examples of information we use to impose constraints (closures) are, for example, 
a budget constraint, the non-negativity of prices, accounting identities, behavioral 
constraints, or the average profit rate in an economy. So long as these constraints are 
binding we should expect to find persistent macroeconomic phenomena consistent 
with the PME. As Jaynes describes the PME, “when we make inferences based on in- 
complete information, we should draw them from that probability distribution that 
has the maximum entropy permitted by the information we do have.”(Jaynes1982) 
In applications, inferences about a system from imposed informational con- 
straints are typically made by using moment constraints as with the mean energy 
constraint. The problem is then one of maximizing entropy subject to the normal- 
ization constraint of probabilities summing to one, as well as any other constraints 
that act on the system as a whole.11 From this perspective, we can see that for 
Jaynes the ensemble of “bins” and their relative probabilities describe a certain 
state of knowledge and for this reason he believed the connection between Shan- 
non’s information theory and statistical mechanics was that the former justified the 
latter. 
We stress that the concept of entropy in economics is a general method of in- 
ference that is not in direct correspondence with the physical theory of thermody- 
namics. We use the PME to make inferences about the mechanisms and processes 
in a complex system with many degree of freedom that generate stable macroscopic 
regularities. The predictive relevance of maximum entropy inference is  conditional 
on the ability of the statistical model to produce observable regularities in the sys- 
tem under analysis. The statistical model is determined by information about the 
system  incorporated  as  constraints  that  modify  the  predictive  distribution.  Thus, 
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the probability distribution that achieves maximum entropy over the relevant do- 
main is a logically equivalent representation of our state of knowledge. That is, 
the maximum entropy distribution expresses what we know while being maximally 
non-committal toward  what we  do  not. 
 
3.3 Farjoun and Machover’s gamma conjecture 
FM implicitly follow this logic in arguing that, “[t]he chaotic movement in the market 
of millions of commodities and of tens of thousands of capitalists chasing each other 
and competing over finite resources and markets, cannot be captured by the average 
rate of profit, any more than the global law of the apparently random movement of 
many millions of molecules in a container of gas can be captured by their average 
speed.” (Farjoun1983) They predict a probabilistic approach to better explain 
this chaotic movement, and derive two claims from it. First, that the distribution 
should not change its shape or location over time, that is, that the profit rate 
distribution is stationary. This is the notion of a statistical equilibrium, as opposed 
to a deterministic one. Secondly, they predict the shape of the distribution by 
reasoning that “In a gas at equilibrium, the total kinetic energy of all the molecules 
is a given quantity. It can then be shown that the ‘most chaotic’ [the maximum 
entropy] partition of this total kinetic energy among the molecules results in  a 
gamma distribution... if we consider that in any given short period there is a more- 
or-less fixed amount of social surplus... and that capitalist competition is a very 
disorderly mechanism for partitioning this surplus among capitalists in the form of 
profit, then the analogy of statistical mechanics suggests that R [the rate of profit] 
may also have a gamma distribution.”(Farjoun1983) 
The gamma distribution FM propose is defined for a continuous random  quantity 
X ∈ [0, ∞) by two parameters α > 0, β > 0 
 
 
βα 
G[x; α, β] = 
Γ[α] x 
 
(α−1) 
 
e−βx 
 
(5) 
 
where brackets indicate arguments of functions, α is the shape parameter of the 
positively skewed distribution, and β is a rate parameter. The expected value of a 
gamma distribution is E[x] = α  and the variance V ar[x] =  α . Figure 3 shows the β β2 
gamma distribution for various β while holding α = 4 (Farjoun1983). 
 
[Figure 1 about  here.] 
 
Using the PME, we can ascertain that FM’s claim that the annual profits in an 
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economy should be partitioned so as to give rise to a gamma distribution rests on 
particular constraints on the entropy maximization program: a non-negative sup- 
port, and fixed arithmetic  and  geometric  means.  In  Appendix  B,  we  show that 
the gamma distribution indeed arises from these three constraints. For these con- 
straints to apply, they should be motivated using economic theory, as they amount 
to assumption of three instances of information about the economy. First, non- 
negativity of profit rates, secondly, a “conserved” mean profit rate. Thirdly, the 
geometric mean constraint translates into the constant average growth rate of the 
size of profits for firms of any size or “scale invariance” of profit rates. FM do not 
spell out nor motivate these assumptions claiming too great “technical and concep- 
tual difficulties” (Farjoun1983), but simply claim a gamma distribution in analogy 
with a gas. Once these assumptions are spelled out however, our theoretical prior 
is from the beginning that this model is misspecified as the gamma distribution is 
only defined on the positive support [0, ∞) which a priori excludes negative profit 
rates. We are more agnostic about the other two constraints, which might possibly 
be justified from economic theory. A look at actual profit rate distributions will test 
the accuracy of our information based on which we infer a distributional shape. 
 
4 Data and Plot Method 
 
4.1 Data 
The data we examine is from the merged Compustat/CRSP Annual Northern Amer- 
ican Fundamentals database comprising US stock market-listed companies spanning 
the years 1962-2014,12 for which the distribution of profit rate cross sections have 
not yet been analyzed. Government as well as financial services, real estate, and 
insurance have been excluded because the former does not partake in competition 
and the latter adhere to different  accounting  conventions  for  revenue calculation 
that makes this part of the industries incomparable. We calculate the profit rate by 
dividing the difference of net sales and operating costs, which equals gross profit, by 
the book value of total assets. From a Marxian point of view, the income accruing 
to capitalists should ideally be divided by “total capital advanced,” which includes 
fixed assets, raw materials and unused labor power, and commercial and financial 
capital (Basu2013). Total assets is an incomplete, but non-restrictive measure of 
“capital advanced” that is measured at historical cost. From our theoretical per- 
spective, assets measured at “replacement cost” would be a more consistent measure 
of capital advanced, however, such a measure is unavailable. Additionally,  we  do 
not believe the two measures will deviate in any systematic or meaningful way at 
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this level of analysis. 
As for comparability of results with those in FM (chapter 7) this cannot be 
ascertained since FM do not disclose how their measure of capital is defined. Unlike 
FM who attempt to partition indivisible units of capital across profit rate bins we 
choose to partition indivisible firms across profit rate bins due to the structure of 
the data. We emphasize the fact that Compustat only provides ex post year-end 
annual profit rate observations while the competitive process that generates the 
equilibrium distribution is unobserved. With this in mind, a complete description 
of the dynamic entry and exit process that gives rise to the equilibrium profit rate 
distribution is not possible and the problem is, therefore, ill-posed and incomplete. 
That is, while a firm like Apple Inc. exists in the dataset for 35 years, they have 
competed in many different niche markets such as phones, computers, televisions, 
tablets, video game consoles, and watches; where Apple has found themselves in an 
unprofitable position they have exited the market (e.g. the Apple Pippin). It is the 
simultaneous decisions of many similar firms to enter and exit particular markets 
that gives rise to the observed profit rate distribution; however, inference is limited 
to year end “snapshots” of this complex dynamic   process. 
Lastly, outliers have been removed using a nonrestrictive Bayesian filter which 
comprise only 3 per cent of the data. Details about the filter are in (Semieniuk2015). 
Our dataset, therefore, is comprised of firms under the standard industrial classifi- 
cation (SIC) numbers 1000-6000 and 7000-9000, containing a total of 285,698 obser- 
vations with on average 5,390 annual observations. The summary statistics for the 
complete data set are presented in Table 1. Appendix A contains full details about 
constructing the dataset. 
 
[Table  1 about here.] 
 
Firm level profit rate distributions have not yet been analyzed in this manner.13 
 
4.2 Logarithmic density plots 
When plotting the histograms of profit rates, logarithmic density scales will be used. 
This is common in analyzing distributional shapes in the industrial organization lit- 
erature because it facilitates identification of exponential distributions and power 
laws (Bottazzi2006; Stanley1996). The effect of rescaling is illustrated in Figure 
2. Both plots show the same normal, Laplace, and gamma density where the left 
plot has a linear density scale and the right one has a logarithmic one. (Double) 
exponential distributions with their fatter tails than normal ones can be easily iden- 
tified because they appear as a straight line (where the slope equals the parameter 
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of the exponential distribution), which will be important when analyzing the em- 
pirical distributions. The Laplace distribution assumes a tent shape, making it easy 
to distinguish it from a normal distribution. The gamma distribution’s positive tail 
also approximates a straight line for α ≈ 1 (in the plot α = 4).  In log plots of em- 
pirical distributions it is important not to exaggerate the significance of variations 
in the tails, as these are actually very low densities with small variations, which are 
magnified due to the re-scaling. 
[Figure 2 about  here.] 
 
 
5 Empirical Densities 
 
We plot the empirical density of profit rate cross sections for a selection of years in 
Figure 3 on a log probability scale which emphasizes the tent shape of the distri- 
bution. The points correspond to the middle of the histogram bin for a given year. 
Histograms are stacked in the same plot window with different markers for every 
cross section plotted at five year intervals, the upper for the years 1965-1980 and 
the lower one with years spanning  1985-2010. 
 
[Figure 3 about  here.] 
 
5.1 Time invariance of the profit rate distribution 
What immediately stands out from these figures is first, how remarkably organized 
the profit rate observations are into a stationary distribution. The empirical den- 
sities display a clear tent shape characteristic of the Laplace distribution. We can 
also see that the majority of firms achieve profit rates between -20 and +50 per 
cent, but there are important outliers in every year on both sides. In every year the 
distribution has roughly the same mode, and densities fall off in exactly the same 
pattern. Slight differences only occur in the tails, but recalling the log scale of the 
density axis, these variations are very slight indeed and to be expected in noisy, 
observational data. Clearly, FM’s first conjecture – that profit rate distributions are 
expected to be organized into a time invariant distribution – is well supported by 
the data. The statistical equilibrium hypothesis is a good one for the time period 
both in the upper and lower plots. 
The only change to the shape of the distribution occurs in the 1980s, when the 
negative tail swells, resulting from an increasing amount of firms that realize less 
than the modal profit rate and remain alive and active. This lends a negative skew to 
the erstwhile symmetric distribution and suggests there are two “eras” spanned by 
13 
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the data. It has been observed that starting in the 1980s, profitability and net worth 
measures for firms in all industries began to drop (Peristiani2004).14 The profit 
rate cross sections suggest that the statistical equilibrium is perturbed through a 
new constraint on firm activity (survival at lower profit rates), but that it reasserts 
itself in a new form. 
Another important observation from Figure 3 is the astounding organization of 
profit rates above the mode relative to profit rates below the mode. It appears  as 
if the dynamic pressures exerted on firms earning above the most likely, or modal 
rate of profit leads to far greater stability of the macroscopic state of profit rates. 
This may suggest that “the general rate of profit,” as put forth by classical political 
economists as a type of “reference rate” with which entry and exit decisions would 
be determined, might appropriately be captured by the mode of the distribution. 
This reference rate of profit is typically equated with the average rate of profit and 
in the case that the distribution is symmetric the mode will coincide with the mean 
as well as the median. In the later decades of our sample, however, the average lies 
to the left of the mode due to the asymmetry of the distribution. 
In contrast to FM, who use limited sectoral data of the total of British man- 
ufacturing industries, the far more comprehensive Compustat dataset shows the 
distribution of profit rates for almost all industries. Further, the apparent statisti- 
cal equilibrium Laplace distribution is robust to disaggregation by industry. Plots 
of industry-wide and sectoral distributions are presented in Appendix C and show 
that the statistical equilibrium distribution is present at the one- and two-digit SIC 
sectoral industrial group  level. 
 
5.2 The shape of the distribution 
The profit rate distribution is distinctly non-normal and hence deviations from the 
dominant average are not well explained as a sample of independently and iden- 
tically distributed random variables that tend to a normal distribution. But the 
distribution is also markedly non-gamma, and this is clear first from the fact that 
the support of the distribution significantly extends into the negative realm, second, 
the gamma distribution is positively rather than negatively skewed, and last, the 
sharp peakedness and tent shape that appears in the log histogram is more charac- 
teristic of the Laplace distribution.15 The empirical evidence appears to contradict 
FM’s conjecture; yet, a careful discussion of their argument yields additional infor- 
mation about the actual shape of the distribution. FM are acutely aware of the 
non-negativity problem and immediately question “whether it is reasonable to as- 
sume that fR(r) is equal, or very close, to 0 for all negative r. This would mean, 
14 
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in other words, that in a state of equilibrium only a negligible proportion of the 
total capital has a negative rate of profit (that is, makes a loss).”(Farjoun1983) 
While they claim that “At first sight it would seem that this assumption is quite 
unrealistic,” FM nevertheless argue in favor of the gamma distribution due to their 
belief that 
 
1. In normal times the proportion of capital (out of the total capital of the 
economy) in the negative rate-of-profit brackets is much smaller than first 
impressions suggest. 
2. Among the firms that actually do make a loss, there is usually a disproportion- 
ately high number of small firms (firms with a small amount of capital). For 
this reason the proportion of loss-making capital (out of the economy’s total 
capital) is considerably smaller than the number of loss-making firms would 
suggest. 
3. When a firm is reported to be making a ‘loss’, what is usually meant is a 
loss after payment of interest on the capital it has borrowed. This is the ‘loss’ 
shown in the balance-sheet of the firm. However, for the purpose of comparison 
with our model, the interest paid by the firm must be taken as part of the 
profit. A firm whose rate of profit (in our sense) is positive but considerably 
lower than the current rate of interest, and whose capital is partly borrowed, 
may end up (after payment of interest) with a net loss on its balance-sheet.16 
 
The first point is not well supported in our dataset as firms realizing negative 
rates of profit comprise an astounding 20 per  cent  of  total  observations  and in 
some years over 30 per cent of all profit rates are negative. While there is a clear 
cyclicality to the percentage of negative profit rate observations to total observations 
in Figure 4, it appears that the “normal times” of which FM speak may have changed 
since the time of their writing. The prevalence of negative profit rates may be 
considered a norm and this trend certainly warrants further research. 
 
[Figure 4 about  here.] 
 
The second point, that on average negative profits are made by small firms, is 
supported by our data until the 1980s, but fails to hold true in the newer decades. 
We illustrate this in Figure 5 by showing Tukey box plots of profit rates conditional 
on firm size.17 We pool all observations for each era and display the distribution of 
profit rates for each capital   percentile. 
15 
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[Figure 5 about  here.] 
 
From Figure 5 we can see that negative profit rates until around 1980 are hardly 
existent except for very small firms. The lower inter-quartile bound is negative only 
until the the fifth percentile, meaning more than one quarter of firms in that size 
bracket realize negative profit rates. This condition changes considerably later on 
when negative profit rates are pervasive for at least the first four deciles and not 
until the 45th percentile does the inter-quartile range lie exclusively above zero. 
Even some of the largest firms suffer from negative profits and the phenomenon of 
negative profit rates is spread over the entire size distribution in both eras. This 
mass of firms earning negative profit rates adds the negative asymmetry to the 
distribution that is evident in Figure 3. The white diamonds are average profit 
rates conditional on firm size and only coincide with the median and mode above 
the 5th decile of the size distribution (half of the dataset), which is where the profit 
rate distribution becomes symmetric. It is important to realize that the shift is 
primarily in the higher moments of the distribution, and not a shift of the whole 
distribution and its first moment. However, the skew implies that first moment and 
the mode of profit rate realizations no longer coincide. 
FM’s last point that concerns the definition of profit rates is  accounted for  by 
our calculation that measures gross profits as total revenue less operating expenses 
before depreciation. It is from this gross pool of surplus that profit is distributed 
post festum to interest payments on capital, taxes, et cetera, leaving more meagre 
returns for the production capitalists. But the present analysis shows that some 20 
to 35 per cent of firms even struggle with negative gross profit   rates. 
It follows, therefore, that negative profit rates are an important characteristic 
of the general profit rate distribution and assuming non-negativity would indeed 
amount to an “extremely rigid” approach that is not, “at all realistic [..] as an ap- 
proximate description of the behaviour of a real capitalist economy” (Farjoun1983). 
It is also important to realize that non-negativity is a gratuitous assumption in the 
statistical approach to economic theory. In our discussion of the results in the 
next section, we show that reasoning based on the PME can equally well lead  to 
a distribution, that can better capture the shape of the statistical equilibrium for 
negative values. It can be motivated in the same way as we did above for the gamma 
distribution. 
16 
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6 An Alternative Theoretical Distribution 
 
Having established that profit rates are not well approximated by a gamma distribu- 
tion, but pursuing a statistical equilibrium approach, the foregoing visual inspection 
leads us to propose a Laplace or double exponential distribution as the theoretical 
distribution that better approximates the shape of the empirical one. The Laplace 
distribution is the maximum entropy distribution when the mean absolute size of 
deviations from the average of the quantity under consideration is constrained and 
the continuous random variable X is non-vanishing on the open support (−∞, ∞) 
(Kotz2001). From the point of view of economic theory, the constraint leading to 
the Laplace distribution can be interpreted as competitive pressure on the dispersion 
of profit rates, without setting an absolute lower boundary such as non-negativity. 
Firms straying too far above the general rate of profit are reined in by stricter com- 
petition from new entrants. Firms sustaining negative profits for too long change 
sectors or go out of business. 
 
6.1 The Laplace distribution as a candidate 
Formally, the Laplace distribution arises from the following maximum entropy pro- 
gramming problem: 
 
max − 
{p[x]≥0 | x∈R} 
r ∞ 
p[x]log[p[x]]dx 
−∞ 
subject to 
and 
r ∞ 
|x − µ|p[x]dx = c 
−∞ 
r ∞ 
p[x]dx = 1 
−∞ 
(6) 
where c > 0 is a constant and µ ∈ R is the location parameter corresponding to a 
reference rate of profit.18 When plugging the new constraints into the general form 
of the mathematical programming problem posed in Appendix B, the solution is the 
Laplace  distribution: 
 
1 x−µ|/c 
L[x; c, µ] = 2ce
−| (7) 
 
Visual inspection of the fit suggests that this density function fits the data well for 
all firms until 1980, as seen in Figure 6, and is surprisingly parsimonious in its single 
moment constraint.  Other studies tend to use distributions with a higher  number 
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of parameters, which are theoretically more difficult to motivate (Buldyrev2007). 
Using the PME highlights this issue, as each additional parameter also requires an 
additional constraint that must be motivated by information about the distribution 
derived from economic theory. Those constraints that are redundant will not change 
the maximum entropy distribution and those that are unwarranted or incorrect will 
lead to poor predictive distributions. 
[Figure 6 about  here.] 
 
In the newer era we have seen that the negative tail becomes fatter and an asym- 
metry develops. This translates into a skewed density plot in Figure 7, suggesting 
that while the symmetric Laplace model does a remarkable job of capturing the ma- 
jor features of the profit rate distribution, there appear to be some secular trends 
in the higher moments of the distribution that the single constraint Laplace model 
does not predict. 
 
6.2 Beyond symmetric Laplace 
One way of dealing with the asymmetry is to assume that the relevant process 
generating the equilibrium profit rate distribution is for a subset of larger more es- 
tablished firms only. Smaller firms are then subject to separate constraints. Indeed, 
the earlier boxplot in Figure 5 showed that above the median firm size, symmetry 
asserts itself even in the newer period. Pursuing this logic, as did Alfarano2012 
we end up discarding a substantial amount of data and information and can only 
reason about a minor subset of the population of firms embroiled in competition. 
This raises the question of how competition among small, and competition among 
large firms influence each other. On the other hand, assuming that all firms are 
competing with each other, and following the logic of Jaynes1979 this innovation 
in the distribution can be accounted for by additional constraints. We propose one 
possible avenue for approaching this problem by solving for the maximum entropy 
distribution with an additional constraint motivated by economic theory, but leave 
the question open for further   research. 
[Figure 7 about  here.] 
 
In order to incorporate additional information that will modify the maximum 
entropy distribution we can impose a constraint that will introduce an asymmetry 
into the distribution. One logical candidate is to treat infra- and supra-modal obser- 
vations as subject to separate mean constraints. Formally, the constraint becomes 
a piecewise mean constraint around the modal, reference rate of profit (µ). 
18 
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1c2 
 
max − 
{p[x]≥0 | x∈R} 
r ∞ 
p[x]log[p[x]]dx 
−∞ 
subject to 
r µ 
(µ − x)p[x]dx = c1, 
−∞ 
r ∞ 
 
(8) 
(x − µ)p[x]dx = c2, 
µ 
r ∞ 
p[x]dx = 1 
−∞ 
 
The mathematical solution to this modified programming problem is the asym- 
metric Laplace distribution (Kotz2001; Kotz2002): 
 
 
  1 
 e 
(x−µ) 
√c1c2+c1 if x ≤ µ 
AL[x; c1, c2, µ] = (√c
 + √c    (9) 
1 2 
2  (x  µ)  e− √c  
− 
+c 2 if x > µ 
 
where c1, c2 > 0 and µ ∈ R.  The addition of the piecewise constraint greatly im- 
proves the fit of the distribution as is evident in Figure 7. The additional constraint 
continues to capture the stable exponential character of supra-modal profit rates 
while also accounting for the asymmetry of the distribution. Although infra-modal 
profit rates after 1980 no longer appear as a straight line – indicating a trend in 
the higher moments of the infra-modal part of the distribution – the two constraint 
maximum entropy asymmetric Laplace specification is remarkably more successful 
at capturing the general structure of the profit rate distribution throughout the 
sample. 
Formally, these constraints separate positive and negative deviations from the 
mode into two different components of the aggregate distribution. Theoretically, 
this parametrization of the asymmetric Laplace distribution is motivated by the 
idea of separate entry and exit dynamics where firms below the modal, or reference 
rate of profit, are worked upon by different pressures from the macro environment 
than those on the positive side. For supra-modal firms, there are strong organizing 
principles that structure the firm population’s ability to generate returns, which 
result in a statistical equilibrium. That is, entry competition as captured by the c1 
constraint is constantly producing an exponential distribution above the mode or 
general rate of profit. This results in a stable c1 over the entire sample period which 
is seen in Figure 8. On the other hand, the exit pressure on infra-modal firms – 
captured by the c2 constraint – appears to be trending downwards, allowing an ever 
19 
 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Metroeconomica published Wiley on 7 June 2016, available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meca.12134  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23157/                                          
 
 
greater deviation in losses for a growing fraction of U.S. stock-market listed firms, 
that additionally fluctuates at business cycle frequencies. 
 
[Figure 8 about  here.] 
 
We believe these constraints are theoretically consistent with a “classical” theory 
of competition where profitability is defined in reference to a general rate of profit 
that in turn regulates the distribution of capital. Further, we see no a priori reason to 
believe the pressures acting on capital realizing returns below the general rate to be 
the same as those acting on capital realizing returns above the general rate. In fact, 
a reasonable prior would be that firms facing exit pressures, such as the liquidation 
of used capital stock, face a quite different environment than firms attempting to 
maintain their relatively profitable position or of new firms entering these relatively 
profitable markets. This line of reasoning leads to explicit consideration of the joint 
distribution of unobserved entry and exit decisions and the way these decisions 
indirectly determine the marginal distribution of profit rates observed here.19 When 
c1 = c2 the constraint becomes redundant and the maximum entropy distribution 
collapses into the symmetric Laplace distribution. Interestingly, this appears to be 
the case prior to 1980, suggesting more “symmetric” pressures across the spectrum 
of profitability. 
Conventional goodness-of-fit tests like the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test show that 
neither symmetric nor asymmetric Laplace distributions capture all features of the 
noisy empirical data. We note that these tests do not impose a penalty for addi- 
tional model complexity and with large samples sizes are highly sensitive to small 
deviations from the candidate distribution. We favor the application of the more 
sensitive entropy based information distinguishability criterion (Soofi2002) that 
shows that the asymmetric Laplace candidate captures more than 90 per cent of 
the informational content in the empirical distribution. Explaining the residual in- 
determinacy would require additional constraints motived by economic theory that 
avoid overfitting. Details and output of these measures are discussed in Appendix 
D. 
In summary, although we have an incomplete description of the distribution of 
profit rates in the newer era, we still see a remarkable amount of organization of 
the distribution in both eras and we believe this organization represents important 
information about the competitive process, which can largely be captured by a 
parsimonious maximum entropy model. The apparent change in the equilibrium 
distribution suggests our knowledge about the newer era may be incomplete and new 
information needs to be accounted for.  The proposed statistical approach allows   the 
20 
 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Metroeconomica published Wiley on 7 June 2016, available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meca.12134  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23157/                                          
 
 
researcher to confront and study this phenomenon and challenges economic theory 
to investigate this development more  closely. 
 
6.3 Economics and the Principle of Maximum Entropy 
Before concluding, we stress the potential of the PME method of inference for 
economics. FM claimed loosely that competition between firms could be seen as 
molecules interacting in a gas, therefore profit rates – like the characteristics of 
molecules – should be distributed as a gamma distribution. We have shown that 
starting from maximum entropy as a general principle of inference forces the re- 
searcher to be precise about the constraints that lead to a particular maximum 
entropy distribution and that the predictive relevance of maximum entropy infer- 
ence is conditional on the ability of the statistical model to produce observable 
regularities in the system under analysis. The case of the non-negativity assump- 
tion for a gamma distribution allowed us to exclude the gamma distribution as a 
candidate due to strict inability to ever predict a negative profit rate. 
Crucially, we believe that in the selection of alternative candidate distributions, 
additional constraints on the maximum entropy program require economic justifi- 
cation. Insight into competition between firms is not improved simply by observing 
that the data is better approximated by an asymmetric exponential power distribu- 
tion than an asymmetric Laplace distribution (Appendix D), which is not surprising 
given the additional model complexity. The data tell us that there is additional in- 
formation that is not explained by existing constraints, but theory must be able 
to motivate constraints that can account for this additional information. This may 
require developing theoretical insights based on a more granular examination of the 
irregularities, such as the characteristics of the firms that make the negative tail 
fatter than the positive one. The joint application of the PME coupled with moti- 
vation from economic theory can lead to new research questions and insights about 
the profit rate. It is obvious that this method of inference may be applied to any 
quantity in economics for which an ensemble can be constructed. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
The distribution of the rate of profit is the outcome of an enormous number of 
independent decisions of individual firms to compete in a multitude of disparate 
markets. It is an unintended consequence of individual capitals seeking higher  rates 
of return which gives rise to observed statistical regularities. The present research 
into the empirical distribution of firm profit rates started from the assertion that 
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the general form of the profit rate distribution arising from this disorderly process 
is neither degenerate nor an arbitrary time variant one. For publicly traded U.S. 
firms, we have shown that profit rates are extremely well organized into a tent 
shape characteristic of the Laplace distribution. This distribution shows strong time 
invariant qualities consistent with the statistical equilibrium hypothesis, displaying 
only a shift in the higher moments in the 1980s towards a new, skewed invariant 
distribution. 
We have argued for the viability of statistical reasoning and the maximum en- 
tropy approach for this problem and have shown that given the right information the 
configuration of profit rates can be well approximated by a maximum entropy dis- 
tribution with one to two constraints, both motivated by economic theory. For the 
dataset that we considered, two paths of further research emerge from the present 
study that we consider particularly promising for generating new insights. First, 
identifying the relevant information about competition in the last three and half 
decades that can account for the reconfiguration of the profit rate distribution and 
formulating them as proper constraints  may  shed  light  on  structural  changes  in 
the competitive environment of the US economy. This will require more theorizing 
about why firms that do less well than the general rate of profit can survive longer 
now than in the period before the 1980s. Secondly, the lack of coincidence of the 
distribution’s first moment and its mode due to the skew of the distribution leads 
to the question what summary information about profit rates is sufficient to use in 
analyzing an economy. Just as with heavily skewed income distributions, where the 
average earning may not say much about the income of most households, a mean 
profit rate pulled down by negative outliers may hide a “healthier” profit rate of the 
large majority of firms when doing aggregate industry   analysis. 
This research, based on applying the principle of maximum entropy and ex- 
plaining constraints with economic logic, leads to asking new questions about long- 
existing phenomena, not only for profit rates, but also in a number of other fields. 
One example is the labor market where information about wages and obstacles to 
mobility translated into constraints on possible wage distributions may reveal a sta- 
tistical equilibrium in wage rates dependent on sector or country. Another is the 
interpretation of firm rates of growth or capital accumulation as a process where 
information about markets – and firm covariates such as the profit rate – may yield 
a rich theory of statistical equilibrium in industrial dynamics. The increasing avail- 
ability of micro-level datasets further encourages analyzing the whole distribution 
of several economic variables rather than only one or at best two moments, which 
are not sufficient to capture the information contained in the distribution in case of 
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non-Gaussian  distributions. 
 
 
Notes 
1See Jensen1953; Pikler1951 for early developments of similar stochastic  modeling. 
2The same can be said of Frohlich2013 who argues in favor of the gamma distribution, but 
does not explain the underlying assumptions linking it to a statistical equilibrium framework. 
3See Fratini2016 for  a  fully  developed  stochastic model of  price gravitation  from  a classical 
perspective. 
4See Shaikh2015 for a discussion of equilibrium as a turbulent equalization process. Shaikh 
argues that the “law of one price” disequalizes profit rates within an industry due to differing 
technology, but that capital flows between industries into regulating capitals “turbulently equalizes” 
the profit rate. Equilibrium, in this sense is perpetual fluctuation of the profit rates of regulating 
capitals (approximated by the “incremental rate of profit”) around a common average value. 
5See Mirowski1991 
6The term was introduced by Rudolph Clausius in the 1850s as a measure of energy dissipa- 
tion in thermodynamic systems. However, since Claude Shannon’s pioneering work on information 
theory (Shannon1948) the term has been used to describe a variety of mathematical expres- 
sions and the one above has been referred to as the “classical” Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon entropy 
(Gorban2010). 
7The solution to this problem is the exponential distribution (Kapur1992). 
8These conditions were (1) for a discrete random variable with uniform probabilities the uncer- 
tainty  should  be  a  monotonically  increasing  function  of  the  number  of  outcomes  for  the  random 
variable,  (2)  if  one  splits  an  outcome  category  into  a  hierarchy  of  functional  equations  then  the 
uncertainty  of  the  new  extended  system  should  be  the  sum  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  old  system 
plus the uncertainty of the new subsystems weighted by its probability, and (3) the entropy should 
be a continuous function of the probabilities pi. 
9Maximum entropy subject only to the normalization constraint is the uniform distribution. 
Intuitively this corresponds to maximum uncertainty as each possible state is equally probable. On 
the other hand, minimum entropy is represented by a degenerate distribution, which intuitively 
represents maximum certainty, one outcome with a probability of   one. 
10Importantly, this inferential way of approaching entropy requires no additional assumptions 
about ergodicity, and is thus immune to the criticism of, for instance, Nicholas GeorgescuRoegen1971 
As Jaynes1979 argued, with “the belief that a probability is not respectable unless it is also a 
frequency, one attempts a direct calculation of frequencies, or tries to guess the right “statistical as- 
sumption” about frequencies, even though the available information does not consist of frequencies,  
but consists rather of partial knowledge of certain “macroscopic” parameters...  and the    prediction 
s desired are not frequencies, but estimates of certain other parameters... The real problem is not 
to determine frequencies, but to describe one’s state of knowledge by a probability distribution.” 
11This probability assignment of microstates will then describe the state of knowledge which we 
have. An important implication of the PME is that in these problems the “imposed macroscopic 
constraints surely do not determine any unique microscopic state; they ensure only that the state 
vector is somewhere in the HPM [high probability manifold]... macroscopic experimental conditions 
still leave billions of microscopic details undetermined” (Jaynes1979).  That is to say, the aggregate 
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does not favor one micro state over another, unless information about specific microstates leads to 
different constraints that might give better macroscopic  predictions. 
12We follow the convention of Fama1992 who point out that there is a serious selection bias in 
pre-1962 data that is tilted toward big, historically successful   firms. 
13The only other work to examine firm level profit rate distributions, Alfarano2012 find near- 
Laplace profit rate cross sections in a small sample of only long-lived firms from Thomson Datas- 
tream data. Indeed, sample selection based on a covariate such as age or size for studying the 
distributions of firm characteristics is justified under the prior belief that small or young firms 
belong to an entirely different set of data that are subject to separate “entry and exit” dynamics, 
which do not play a significant role in determining the statistical equilibrium distribution. How- 
ever, the essentially arbitrary determination of what is “long lived” or “large” may prevent an 
understanding how the large majority of competitive firm profit rates are distributed, since a large 
share of firms are small or short-lived. We believe a more flexible method for sample selection that 
explicitly models the noise and signal can improve this line of   research. 
14It is remarkable that this shift coincides with the transition to what has been called a “neolib- 
eral” economic environment in the  US. 
15The Laplace distribution has also been found to describe firm growth rates (Bottazzi2003a; 
Bottazzi2003b; Bottazzi2006) and a sample of profit rates in long-lived firms (Alfarano2012). 
16This enumeration cites Farjoun1983 
17Tukey box plots show observations removed more than 1.5 times the length of the interquartile 
support from either the upper or lower quartile as dots rather than whiskers. 
18The location parameter µ is a fixed reference rate of profit to which firms compare their indi- 
vidual profit rates. In the theoretical density, µ is equal to the mean, median, and mode due to the 
symmetry of the Laplace distribution that need not enter the programming problem as an explicit 
constraint.  Any translation of the distribution necessarily does not change its entropy.  See   section 
3.1.2 in Kapur1989 for a variety of derivations of the maximum entropy Laplace distribution  with 
a location parameter as well as remark 3.4.5 in   Kotz2001 
19See Scharfenaker2015a for a more thorough discussion of this problem as well as a proposed 
quantal response model of firm competition. 
 
 
Appendix A: Data Sources 
 
Data is gathered from the merged Compustat/CRSP Annual Northern American 
Fundamentals database through the University of Sussex. We extract yearly ob- 
servations of the variables AT = Total Assets, REVT = total revenue, XOPR = 
operating cost, SIC = Standard Industry Code, FYR = year, CONM = company 
name, from 1962 through 2014. Subtracting XOPR from REVT and dividing by AT 
gives the conventional measure of return on assets (ROA) which we use as proxy 
for gross profit rates. Total assets are reported according to generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) and are measured at historical cost. 
Our raw data set consists of 467,666 observations of each indicator. Subtracting 
completely missing values, government and finance, insurance and real estate -  gov- 
24 
 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Metroeconomica published Wiley on 7 June 2016, available 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meca.12134  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23157/                                          
 
 
ernment because it is not engaged in a search for profit maximization but pursues 
other objectives and finance et al. because the different accounting methods where 
part of income is not recorded in REVT, leading to profit rates almost zero - we 
impute the remaining missing values under the assumption of values missing at ran- 
dom.  Our completed case dataset contains 294,476 observations or roughly 7,177 
observations per year. This data contains outliers of profit rates greater than 108 
and less than −105 per cent. Our prior is that these observations are an artifact of 
the ratio we use to calculate profit rates and are therefore noise. We pass our data 
set year by year through a Bayesian filter that models the data as a mixture of a 
“signal” Laplace and a diffuse Gaussian “noise” distribution. This method uses a 
Gibbs sampler to assign each firm a latent variable with posterior probability dis- 
tribution of either belonging to the “signal” or “noise.” We make an unrestrictive 
decision by discarding all observation with latent posterior mean below 0.05 per cent 
chance of belonging to the signal. Using this method we discard only 3 per cent of 
our data effectively ridding our data set of massive outliers with a minimal loss of 
information. Due to the likelihood dominance of our data this procedure will have 
imperceptible effects on the general form of the empirical distribution. The advan- 
tage of our Bayesian filter compared to an ad hoc truncation of the dataset (e.g. 
clipping the top and bottom 1 per cent) is that it endogenizes our sample selection 
based on our prior that large outliers are noise, and explains outliers as generated 
by a different distribution. Since any data truncation would have to be based on 
some “trial and error” procedure of adequately ridding “unacceptably” large outliers 
we prefer an endogenous selection process that makes this prior explicit. The re- 
maining data set contains 285,698 observations. It is important to note that due to 
the extremely diffuse Gaussian noise component of the mixture filter, filtering only 
removes observations far out in the tails, and hence does not influence the density 
of the empirical distribution except at the extreme outliers in the top and bottom 
two percentiles. Full details on the filter can be found in Semieniuk2015 
 
Appendix B: The Maximum Entropy Derivation of the 
Gibbs Distribution 
Jaynes’ principle of maximum entropy inference can be formalized by first trans- 
lating the assumed properties of a system into moment constraints and then by 
maximization of uncertainty subject to these constraints via the entropy functional 
H[x] = − 
( 
p[x]log[p[x]]dx.  A “constraint” is understood as any information that 
leads one to modify a probability distribution.  The problem is then one of con- 
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 N 
strained optimization. 
To attain the general solution to this problem consider a finite set of N polyno- 
mials {gi[x]} for a continuous variable x ∈ R with an undefined probability density 
p[x]. Define the ith-moment Mi as: 
 
r 
p[x]gi[x]dx = Mi i = 1, 2, ..., N (2) 
 
Setting  g0[x]  ≡ 1  and  M0  ≡ 1  as  the  constraint  corresponding  to normalization 
assures p[x] will be a probability density function. The problem of maximum en- 
tropy inference is to find p[x] subject to the requirement that uncertainty (H[x]) is 
maximized subject to information we have expressed as moment constraints. What 
this achieves is maximal ignorance given the information available and an “insur- 
ance policy” against gratuitous assumptions or spurious details unwarranted by the 
data.  The constrained maximization problem   is: 
r 
max − 
{p[x]≥0| x∈X} 
r 
 
p[x]log[p[x]]dx 
 
 
(3) 
subject to p[x]gi[x]dx = Mi 
 
Using Lagrange multipliers for each moment constraint form the augmented 
functional: 
r 
L ≡ − 
N fr 
p[x]log[p[x]]dx − 
, 
λi 
i=0 
\ 
p[x]gi[x]dx − Mi 
 
(4) 
 
We  find  the  critical  points  by  differentiating  the  functional  with  respect  to p[x] 
according to the Euler-Lagrange equation  ∂F  − d (  ∂F  ) = 0. Noticing the second 
term is equal to zero we  get: 
∂f [x] dx   ∂f t[x] 
 
  ∂L 
N 
= −(1 + log[p[x]]) − 
, 
λ g [x] = 0 (5) 
∂p[x] i i 
i=0 
 
Solving for p[x] results in the maximum entropy   distribution: 
 
p[x] = Z[λ]e− i=1 λigi[x] (6) 
 
where Z[λ] = e1+λ0   is the undetermined normalization constant referred to as the 
partition function. The family of distributions of this form are known as the expo- 
nential family and Eq. 6 is called the Gibbs distribution. 
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Determining the Lagrange multipliers through moment constraints is non-trivial, 
however,  FM’s  assumption  of  a  maximum  entropy  gamma  distribution  is  easily 
attained  by  maximizing  H[x] with  a  constraint  on  support  [0, ∞),  the arithmetic 
mean (x¯ ),  and geometric mean (xˆ )  of a random variable X ∈ Rx≥0. 
 
Appendix C: Empirical Densities by Industry 
 
In this appendix we show the robustness of the profit rate distribution to disaggre- 
gation. Each plot in Figure 9 shows the profit rate distribution at the two-digit SIC 
level embedded in the one-digit SIC industry for each era. At the one-digit level 
(agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, trade and transportation, and 
services) - some industries are combined for visual clarity - the industry profit rate 
distribution is plotted as a solid line, while at the two-digit level we maintain the 
plotting method from above. This way the clustering of industries at the two-digit 
SIC level around their parent industry is evident. 
 
[Figure 9 about  here.] 
 
 
Appendix D: Distribution Fit  Tests 
 
Nonparametric goodness-of-fit tests, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,  reject 
the hypothesis that annual cross sections of profit rates belong to the class of Laplace 
distributions for almost every year, and to the Asymmetric Laplace distribution for 
every year after 1967. In order to get more insight into the comparative goodness of 
fit of the data to different distributions, we use the more sensitive information theo- 
retic measure of fit called the information distinguishability statistic (ID) proposed 
by Soofi2002 The ID is a normalized measure of how well a proposed parametric 
distribution function exploits the informational content of an empirical distribution. 
The ID is defined  as: 
ID[f ; f ∗|θ] = 1 − e−∆H [f ;f∗|θ] (2) 
where −∆H[f ; f ∗|θ] is the entropy difference between the empirical histogram distri- 
bution (f ) and a parametric functional distribution (f ∗|θ) where θ is the maximum 
likelihood  estimates  of  f∗.   An  ID[f ; f ∗|θ]  =  0  implies  f ∗  is  a  perfect  parameter- 
ization  of  f ,  i.e  f ∗  exploits  all  information  contained  in  the  data  distribution.   If 
1 > ID[f ; f ∗|θ] > 0 then there remains residual indeterminacy that the model does 
not explain. 
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Figure 10 shows the ID measure for four distributions and the inset shows the 
low p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the symmetric and asymmetric 
Laplace candidates that yields little information about the difference in fit. For the 
ID criterion, on the other hand, we can see that up to 1980 both the Laplace and 
asymmetric Laplace distribution capture an average of roughly 95 per cent of the 
informational content of the data. After 1980, the informational content exploited 
by the Laplace distribution deteriorates sharply. The asymmetric Laplace continues 
to capture on average roughly 93 per cent of the informational content of the data, 
while the more complex three parameter asymmetric exponential power distribution 
on average captures 95 per cent of the information over the entire sample; a minimal 
informational gain over the more parsimonious model. The additional complexity 
of the asymmetric exponential power distribution arises through added constraints 
on the maximum entropy program which we do not believe have a clear theoretical 
justification. 
 
[Figure 10 about here.] 
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Figure 1:  Density plot of the gamma distribution, for β = {20, 40, 80} and α =   4. 
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Figure 2: Density plots on a linear (left) and log scale (right) for the normal dis- 
tribution (solid line), Laplace distribution (dashed line), and gamma distribution 
(dotted line). 
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Figure 3: Stacked histogram plots on a log density scale of profit rates (r) for select 
years. Each shaped point corresponds to the center of the histogram bar for that 
year. Histograms are stacked in order to show the time invariance of the distribution 
suggestive of statistical  equilibrium. 
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Figure 4:  Percentage of negative profit rate observations by   year. 
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Figure 5: Box plots of profit rates conditional on capital percentile for pooled data 
between 1962 and 1980 (top) and 1981 to 2014 (bottom). Box plots show the 
median (black dash), inter-quartile range (box).  Outliers appear as points beyond 
1.5 times the inter-quartile range. White diamonds are the mean profit rates for 
that percentile which only correspond to the median for the symmetric distribution. 
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Figure 6: Stacked histogram plots on a log density scale of profit rates (r) for select 
years for all firms until 1980 with maximum likelihood fitted Laplace distribution 
(L). 
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Figure 7: Top: Stacked histogram plots for select years after 1980. Dashed lines 
represent the maximum likelihood fit of the Laplace distribution (L).    Bottom: 
Stacked histogram plots for select years after 1980. Dashed lines represent the 
maximum likelihood fit of the asymmetric Laplace distribution (AL). 
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Figure 8: Maximum likelihood estimates of µ, c1, and c2 from Eq. 9. Error bars are 
vanishingly small. 
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Figure 9: Histogram plots on a log density scale of profit rates (r) by 2-digit SIC 
code. Years 1962-1980 are plotted on the 3le6ft column and years 1981-2014 are plotted 
on the right column. Solid lines are the sectoral (1-digit SIC) distribution, e.g. for 
all of manufacturing firms. 
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Figure 10: Information distinguishability between four proposed models of increas- 
ing complexity. The normal (N ) and Laplace (L) are two parameter models, the 
asymmetric Laplace (AL) is a three parameter model, and the asymmetric exponen- 
tial power (AEP) is a four parameter model. The inset in the top left shows annual 
p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of goodness of fit of data cross-sections 
to the Laplace  (L) and  the asymmetric  Laplace  (AL)   distributions. 
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Table  1:  Summary statistics of pooled profit rates   (r). 
 
 Min 5 Perc. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd 
Qu. 
95 
Perc. 
Max 
r -1.616 -0.406 0.033 0.112 0.062 0.173 0.294 1.801 
 
